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§ 3.01. Introduction. 
The genesis of this article was John Reeves' s and Matthew Thomp-
son's well-received paper from the 49th Annual Oil and Gas Institute, 
"Significant Cases Governing the Onshore Operating Agreement," 1 
which sought to collect cases that have interpreted the language of 
the model form operating agreements. The suggestion of the program 
chairs was that this article might do a similar analysis of farmout 
agreements. 
Ultimately, however, it became clear that a collection of cases 
prepared in the same way as the Reeves and Thompson article was 
not feasible because there are no model form farmout agreements. 
While farmout agreements tend to share common structures, they do 
not use standard language. Therefore, farmout agreements do not lend 
themselves easily to the same kind of structured, clause-by-clause 
analysis, that can be done on operating agreements. 
Farmout agreements do present, however, frequent and recurring 
drafting problems. Some of those have been discussed in earlier 
papers. 2 But cases decided since these earlier works throw new light 
on those problems, as well as illustrate some that were not discussed. 
These cases and the problems they illustrate will be the focus of this 
article. 
This compilation is subject to several limitations. First, the initial 
research was done in October 1998, so that later-repo1ted cases may 
not be included. Second, in the interest of brevity cases that did not 
appear interesting have been discarded. Third, only those cases that 
arose in the context of farmout agreements are addressed. 3 Fourth, 
it is inevitable that this article will omit 4 or misstate a case that 
l 4911z Oil and Gas Inst. 2-1 (Matthew Bender 1998). 
2 Lowe, "Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements," 41 Southwestern L.J. 759 (1987), 
reprinted at 25 Pub. Land & Res. Dig. 5 (1988) (hereinafter referred to as "SMU"); Lowe, "The 
Meaning of 'Payout' in Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements," 10th Eastem Min. L. Inst. 13-1 
(Matthew Bender 1989). 
3 Nonetheless, this article started with more than 200 cases, and well over 300 cases were 
reviewed in the course of writing this article. Many disputes arise in the context of farmout 
agreements. 
4 It is very easy to overlook conditional-assignment or term-assignment farmouts in legal 
research, because those instruments and the disputes that arise from them may not even use 
the term "farmout." See, e.g., Riley v. Meriwether, 780 S.W.2d 919, Ill 0 . & G.R. 336 (Tex. 
App.-El Paso 1989), writ denied, discussed below. 
(Mallhcw Bender & Co., Inc.) 
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someone thinks is important. Finally, since this article is case-oriented, 
it is not necessarily cohesive. For those looking for a quick overview 
of developments in fannout agreement litigation over the past decade, 
however, this analysis is offered as a place to begin. 
§ 3.02. Contract Formation and Interpretation. 
Parties often negotiate farmout agreements orally or through an 
exchange of letters. Indeed, farmout agreements are often entered into 
in the form of and referred to as "letter agreements."5 As discussed 
elsewhere, disputes often arise over whether the parties have formed 
a binding contract. s Even when the parties agree that there is a 
contract, there is often dispute about what are the terms of the 
agreement. 
[1] The Statute of Frauds. 
The statute of frauds is a potent barrier to claims that a contract 
has been formed or that it means something other than what it says. 7 
Several cases from several jurisdictions in the last ten years have 
turned on the statute's requirement of a writing. 8 In Petrocana Inc. 
v. Margo, 9 the court relied upon the statute of frauds to bar parol 
evidence of a verbal agreement o extend the time for exercise of an 
area of mutual interest provision in a farmout agreement.10 In Keesun 
Partners v. Ferdig Oil Company, Inc., u the Montana Supreme Court 
5 See, e.g., Petrocana v. Margo, 577 So. 2d 274, 11.5 0. & G.R. 84 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991). 
Agreements other than farmouts may also be called "letter agreements," however. See, e.g., 
Raydon Exploration, Inc. v. Ladd, 902 F.2d 1496, 109 0 . & G.R. 70 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing 
a dispute involving a "farmout agreement" and a "letter agreement"), and Billingsley v. Bach 
Energy Corporation, 588 So. 2d 786, 118 0. & G.R. 70 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) ("letter 
agreement" used to describe an agreement to pay a finders fee). 
6 Sec SMU, N. 2 supra at 782-783. See generally Trower, "Enforceability of Letters of Intent 
and Other Prclimina1y Agreements," 24 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 347 ( l 978) (discussing whether 
parties have formed binding contract or have merely engaged in preliminary negotiations). 
7 As discussed in SMU, N. 2 supra at 785, most states classify farmout agreements as interests 
in land, subject to the statute of frauds, whether the interest created by an oil and gas lease 
is viewed as an estate in land or as a profit a prendre and whether the form of the contract 
is bilateral or unilateral. 
8 Compliance with the statute of frauds docs not require a formal contract. Compliance occurs 
if there is "some memorandum or note thereof ... in writing, and signed by the party to be 
charged therewith" or that party's agent. 8 Stat. 405. § 4.24 Car. 2, ch. 3 § 4 (Eng.); Lynch 
v. Davis, 181 Conn. 434, 435 A.2d 977, 980 (l 980). 
9 577 So. 2d 274, 115 0. & G.R. 84 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1991). 
lO 577 Su. 2d at 278. 
11 249 Mont. 331, 816 P.2d 417 (1991). 
(Mntthcw Bc111 ..kr & Co .. Inc.) 
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upheld a summary judgment, based on the statute of frauds, rejecting 
a claim that Ferdig had farmed out to Keesun in reliance on oral 
representations that Keesun would enter into a long-tenn gas process-
ing contract with Ferdig.12 Similarly, in B & A Pipeline Co. v. 
Dorney, 13 the Fifth Circuit held that a farmor had not partially 
performed an allegedly oral gas contract so as to avoid the statute, 
where the farmor had chosen to market his gas through the farmee 
but retained the right to take production in kind. 14 In Crowder v. Tri-C 
Resources, Inc., 15 the statute of frauds barred enforcement of a 
supplemental area of mutual interest agreement to farmed-out acre-
age. 16 The supplemental agreement was referred to in a letter signed 
by the party to be charged with its burden and an outline of the affected 
land was drawn on a plat, but the party to be charged did not sign 
the plat, the plat did not refer to the letter, and the letter neither referred 
to the plat nor described the land.17 In Texaco Inc. v. Mercury 
Exploration Co., 18 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied North 
Dakota law to conclude that the time for performance of a written 
farmout agreement had been not been extended orally .19 Although the 
farmout agreement specifically provided that modifications were to 
be in writing, North Dakota statutory law permits waiver of a writing 
requirement and allows oral modification where "the party performing 
has incurred a detriment which he was not obligated by the original 
contract to incur."20 The court refused to apply the doctrine because 
Mercury gave up no legal rights, incmTed no detriment, and did not 
12 The trial court had held that "there is nothing before the Court that would talce the contract 
between the parties, if there were one, out of the statute of frauds." 816 P.2d at 420. The supreme 
court did not reach the statute of frauds issue, because it found that the parties had nol reached 
mutual assent on all essential terms of the contract. Id. at 422-423. 
13 904 F.2d 996, 112 0. & G.R. 103 (5th Cir. 1990). 
14 904 F.2d at 999-1000. 
15 821 S.W.2d 393, 118 0. & G.R. 538 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991). 
16 821 S.W.2d at 396--397. 
17 Ibid. 
18 994 F.2d 463, 124 0. & G.R. 70 (8th Cir. 1993). Professor Anderson commented on the 
case al 124 0. & G.R. 76. 
19 Texaco and Mercury entered into a farmout agreement under which Mercury was to drill 
three wells before December 31, 1990. 994 F.2d at 464. Mercury failed to complete the wells 
before the deadline, and refused to pay the $150,000 in liquidated damages provided by the 
agreement. Id. at 465. Mercury asserted as a defense that Texaco had orally agreed to an extension 
of time for pcrfonnance.. The federal district court granted Texaco summary judgment. The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affinned, exploring in its opinion the doctrine of the "executed oral 
agreement." 
20 994 F.2d at 465, citing N.D. Cent. Code § 9--09--06 (1987). 
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change its position.21 It also found no evidence that Texaco should 
have been equitably estopped to assert the writing requirement. 22 
Authority of an agent is another aspect of the statute of frauds.23 
In In re Manville Forest Products Corporation, 24 the court applied 
the statute's requirement that a corporate employee have expr:ess, 
written authority to bind the corporation in transaction involving real 
propertyzs to find a written farmout agreement not binding.26 The 
court also refused to apply the apparent authority doctrine, 27 findi11g 
that the doctrine does not extend to real estate transactions. 28 
What each of these cases underscores is that fundamentals count. 
While a contract may be in formal and conci ·e, a' lawyered" agreement 
is more likely to be enforceable and to avoid dispute. These cases 
illusn·ate the importance of putting agreements in writing with c.lear 
drafting (and the clear thinking that i the prerequisite to clear 
drafting). That is what lawyers are _paid to do.29 
[2] The Role of Equity in Farmout Agreements. 
In limited circumstances, equity may offer protection to the parties 
to a farmout-based dispute. The number and diversity of the cases that 
the urvey conducted in preparing this article turned up wa urpnsing, 
though in retrospect it should not have been. The informality with 
which far.mout agreements are often approached by industry pruties 
guarantee that claims for equity will be made frequently, and 
occasionaUy granted. 
Equity may offer limited protection to one who fails to make a 
binding agreement. In Vortt Exploration Co., Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., 
21 994 F.2d at 465. 
22 994 F.2d at 466. 
23 See the discussion at SMU, N. 2 supra at 785. See also Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 
§ 26.01 (West 1998). 
24 89 D.R. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), applying Louisinnn law. 
25 La. Civ. Code. Ann. mt. 2996, 2997. 
26 89 B.R. at 365. The employee had wrliren n.nd recorded amhorily to dcnl with up lo 1,000 
ncres, but the farmout in question covered 3.360 acres. Ibid. 
27 Apparent authority is "[S]uch nulhority as a principle i rHenLionully or by want of ordinary 
care cnuses or allows third person to believe tbnt ngenl possesses." JJ/m:k'.1· Law Dic1iom11y 96 
(6th ed. 1990); see oho Seavey, Ham/book 0/1//11 Law of Agen1;y § 8(0) (1964) (similnr definition 
of npporent nulhority) . 
28 89 B.R. nl 366-368. 
29 See MU, N. 2 supra nl 783- 784. See also the discussion at Lowe, "Developments in 
Nonrugulntory Oil and Gas Lnw: Arc Wu Moving Toward a Kinder and Gentler Law of 
Cont mets'?," 4211d Oil & Gus J11st. § l.02[nJ (Mau hew Sender 1991 ). 
(Mauhcw Bentler & Co., lnc.) 
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Inc., Jo the Texas Supreme Court granted quantum merujr reLief to a 
would-be farmee who provided seismic infon11atioo in Lh cour e of 
unsuccessful negotiations. Vortt proposed rhal Chevron farm out 
interests to him, but Chevron refused. Vortt then proposed an operating 
agreement. 31 Chevron indicated that it rnight be interes ed, and 
negotiations extended over four years, during which time Voitt gave 
Chevron confidential seismic ervices, graphics, and map. t explain 
his theory of the property. Instead of finalizing an operating agreement 
with Vortt, however, Chevron drilled its own well at the lo ation 
identified by Vortt, and then sued Vortt, claiming that his leases were 
invalid. Vortt counterclaimed, seeking quantum mentit. The court of 
appeals reversed an award for Vortt because the jury had made no 
finding that Vortt furnished the information to Chevron so as to 
"reasonabJy notify Chevron that Vortt expected to be paid for Lhe 
services and assistance provided." 32 The T xas Supreme Court 
reversed, reasoning that "the expected payment doe not llave to be 
monetary .... Chevron knew that Vortt furni shed the information 
with the expectation that a joint operating agreement wouJd be reached. 
The parties had negotiated for over four years trying to achieve that 
end."33 
Equity may also provide relief for one who enters into a burdensom 
contract. For example, in Uptegraft v. Dome Petroleum Corp., 34 equity 
permitted a farmor to re cind a farrnout agreement. Dome Petroleum 
farmed out to Atlas and Atlas drilled well s. Both Dome and Atlas knew 
when they contracted that the Uptegrafts held a 2 percent leasehold 
interest in the property. 35 After Atlas had obtained production from 
30 787 S.W.2d 942, 108 0. & G.R. 126 ( 1990). Professor Kramer commented on this case 
at 108 0. & G.R. 132. 
31 787 S.W.2d at 943-944. 
32 Id. at 944. 
33 Id. at 945. Voru is subject to a sarcastic dissent by Justice Hecht: 
Chevron's representatives never asked to sec the informutinn. Vo11t's repr.:sentative n1'.vc1· 
told Chevron that Yortt expected anything in return . .. . [Ajbsolutely the only thing Vortt 
expected to gain was favorable consideration of the proposed agreement .. . . The information 
cost Vortt roughly $18,000. The trial court ordered Chevron to pay Vo11t $178,500 for it. 
Was ever fainter hope more richly rewarded? For not refusing to look at Vortt's information, 
Chevron must pay ten times its cost. The Court's ruling today should be a tremendous 
encouragement o benefaction. A frustrated negotiator should never overlook this tactic in 
attempting to induce agreement. The recipient of  ~ :  u c l 1  cliarity, however, should beware. 
Id. at 945-946. 
34 764 P.2d 1350, 102 0. & G.R. 557 (Okla. 1988). 
35 764 P.2d at 1352. 
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two wells, Dome contacted the Uptegrafts and obtained their ratifica-
tion of the farmout agreement. Dome did not inform the Uptegrafts 
that there was already production on the tract. In fact, Dome's letter 
to the Uptegrafts indicated that the advantages of the farmout agree-
ment to Dome and its cotenants were "evaluation of production in 
those units Atlas drills, and protection of leases which would have 
expired before we could have drilled in this area." 36 The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court based its decision upholding recission of the farmout 
and assignments on the constructive fraud of Dome, as cotenant of 
the Uptegrafts: 
[C]o-tenants of an estate in land stand in a relation to each other of trust 
and confidence and neither will be permitted to act in hostility to the other 
in reference to the joint estate .... Under such circumstances it is not 
improper to conclude that once the co-tenant decided to communicate with 
his co-tenant recommending the execution of the farmout he was duty 
bound to convey the whole truth. 37 
Equity may also reinstate rights that have failed. In Hayes v. E. T.S. 
Enterprises, lnc.,3a Pogo farmed out to E.T.S. While E.T.S. was 
drilling, Pogo released the farmed-out lease. The court held that the 
evidence established that the release was the result of a mistake, and 
that when there is an execution of a release, rather than a negotiated 
contract, a party may claim mistake to revoke the release unless 
another party, in good faith, has relied on the release to its detriment. 39 
36 Ibid. 
37 764 P.2d at 1353. (citations omitted) 
38 809 S.W.2d 652, 119 0. & G.R. 121 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991), writ denied. The author 
commented on the case at Discussion Notes, 119 0 . & G.R. 137. 
39 }-\aycs, the lessor,  ~ l n i m e d  {I) that Pogo did nor mnke a mistake when executing the relense 
because its ext:cmion wos intcntjonal and negligent, :md (2) that even i.f Pogo's cxecinion was 
the resuh of a misu1ko, the uriilnteral mistake did not meet tbe requirements of "remedial mistake." 
809 S.W.2d nt 654. The court of appeals first found that Pogo's release wns the result ofa. mistake 
because the summury judgment evidence sho)lled tlmt the Pogo orficinl executing the release 
would not have executed the release had he known of Pogo's farmout agreement with E.T.S. 
There was also evidence thnt the officinl's execution of the release was due ton clerical error. 
Id. at 655. 111e court nl ·o found thnt E.T.S. 's evidence in the fonn of deposition testimony of 
Pogo's officials and employees satisfied the stricter summary judgment StMdard that appli ed 
to an "interested wiLDess." If a witntl!;s is characterized as "interested," ns E.T.S.'s witnesses 
were, then the evidence must be "clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from 
contrndictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted." Id. at 656. The 
court rejected Hnycs's claim that the requirements of the "rcmedin.I mistake'" rule must hove 
been met for the court w rescind the release, The "remedial mistake" rule would deny equitable 
relfof unless ( I) the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionnble, 
(2) the mismke relates to n material fcntui:e of the contrnct, (3) the mist.nkc occurred despite 
ordinnry cnn:, and (4) the prutics cun be  e n . ~ i l y  pluced back into the struns quo before the contraci. 
(Mauhl.!W Bentler & Co.,  I n  c  ~  )  
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To similar effect is E'xxon Corp. v. Gann. 40 Gann purchased all of 
Exxon's interest in a single well in Oklahoma, but a mistake in the 
assignment and bill of sale resulted in the transfer of two additional 
wells. 41 Exxon sought reformat1on based on the doctrine of mutual 
mistake. Gann contended that there was no mutual mistake and that 
the mistake was the result of Exxon's own negligence. 42 Both the 
district court and the Tenth Circuit held that Gann intended to buy 
only the one well. 43 The Tenth Circuit court refused to overturn the 
district court's finding of fact, and also recognized that Oklahoma 
courts have been reluctant to strictly constme the requirement that the 
party seeking reformation must not have been negligent in forming 
the contract. Oklahoma courts use a balancing test to determine if the 
negligence involved rises to a level of "culpable negligence" that 
violates a legal duty in order to bar reformation. 44 
Equity may even protect one who has technically breached a 
contract. In Crescent Drilling & Development, Inc. v. Sealexco, Inc., 45 
the court upheld a trial court's application of estoppel and waiver to 
award an investor an interest in a well drilled under a farmout 
agreement, though the investor had failed to provide funds timely. 46 
The facts showed that the company that held the interest had allowed 
participants to make elections and payments late as a matter of course, 
had in fact accepted and used the late payment, and owed the investor 
amounts substantially in excess of the amount due. 47 To the same 
effect is Waldron v. Zapata Exploration Company. 4s There, Waldron 
farmed out his interests in over 7 ,500 acres to Zapata Exploration, 
which promised to pay $1.3 million and commence drilling by a 
The court reasoned that the "'remedial mi 1:ike'" rnle relates only to negotiated contracts nnd not 
to the unilmeral execution of n release. The court's rarionale was that recission of a negotinted 
contract would be inequitable unless the numbered requ.irements existed. However, when there 
is a unilateral release mrher Limn a ucgotiutecl contract, a party only needs to show (I) that the 
release was made as a result of a mistake, and (2) Ll1at another party in good faith did not rely 
on the release to its detriment. Id. at 658-659. 
40 21 F.3d 1002, 128 0. & G.R. 532 (10th Cir. 1994). Professor Maxwell commented on 
the case at Discussion Notes. 128 0 . & G.R. 542. 
41 21 F.3d at 1004. 
42 Id. at 1005. 
43 Id. at 1005- 1006. 
44 Id. at 1006--1007. 
45 570 So. 2d 151, I 13 0. & G.R. 82 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1990). 
46 570 So. 2d al 155. 
47 Ibid. 
48 878 S.W.2d 349, 129 0 . & G.R. 565 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994). 
(Matt.hew Bender & Cu., Inc.) 
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certain date. 49 Zapata failed to drill by the critical date and an 
extension, but instead of suing, 5o Waldron encouraged Zapata to 
continue searching for someone who would drill. Two years later the 
well was finally drilled and resulted in a dry hole. Waldron then sued 
Zapata for breach of the original farmout agreement. 51 The appeals 
court found that the trial court properly submitted the issue of waiver 
to the jury, which found that the plaintiff had waived any claim against 
Zapata for breach of the promise to drill by the expiration date of the 
Cockrell farmout agreement. 52 
Equity may also impose liability, however. Dews v. Halliburton 
Industries, Inc., 53 held that a farmee, who had assigned his interest 
under a farmout agreement to another who then partially performed 
by drilling the earning well, would be unjustly enriched if he were 
permitted to claim the benefit of the well drilled by the assignee 
without being obligated to pay the charges of the drilling and service 
companies to which the assignee had defaulted. 54 
[3] Contract Interpretation. 
The prevailing theme of farmout cases, however, is that the parties 
to a transaction will be restricted to and bound by the explicit terms 
of their agreement- that equitable principles will not apply to create 
obligations that the contract does not address or vary those that it does. 
Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC Corp. 55 is an example. Aminoil owned 
working interests in an off shore lease. When the lease operator 
proposed a platform, Aminoil decided to farm out its interest to OKC. 
Aminoil and OKC discussed Aminoil retaining an overriding royalty 
that would be convertible on payout of the platform into a net profits 
interest in the production from the platform. Aminoil and OKC even 
exchanged written communication to that effect. But when Aminoil 
drew up the farmout agreement, it contained a reservation of interest 
49 878 S.W.2d at 350. 
so Apparently the suit was for the cash payment. In Texas. one cannot recover damages for 
nnother's failure to drill without showing 1hut 1he well would have been profitable. See Guardian 
Trust v. Brothers. 59 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1933), wr it n:f'd. See also 
the ll lscossion at MU, N. 2 supra nt 812- 814. 
51 878 S.W.2(] ·at 350. 
52 Id. at 351. 
53 
708 S.W.2d 67, 89 0. & G.R. 455 (Ark . 1986). 
54 708 S.W.2d at 69. 
. 
55 
812 F.2d 265, 98 0 . & G.R. 84 (5th Cir. 1987). Professor Martin commented on this case 
in Discussion Notes, 98 o. & G.R. 93. 
(MotUiew Bentler & Co., 1nc.) 
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in the entire lease. 56 OKC reviewed the agreement for nearly five 
weeks and then executed it. The trial court found that the lease was 
unambiguous and that Aminoil had reserved an interest in the entire 
lease. OKC argued for reformation under Louisiana law based on 
mutual mistake of the parties. The Fifth Circuit Court held that OKC 
could not show mutual mistake where the parties were experienced 
in transactions of this type, 57 the agreement had been extensively 
reviewed, the provision was central to the agreement, 58 the writing 
was clear and unambiguous, 59 and there was no evidence that Aminoil 
shared in the mistake. 60 
A United States District Court in Kansas applied a similar analysis 
in Amoco Production Co. v. Hugoton Energy Corp., 61 a dispute that 
arose either because the parties did not understand their complex 
agreement or because they did not administer it carefully. Amoco 
farmed out to Hugoton ten drilling blocks, each of which included 
Amoco's leases in nine sections.62 The contract provided for Hugoton 
to earn assignments of Amoco's leases based on a complex scheme 
of Exploratory Test Wells (ETWs) and Development Test Wells 
(DTWs), and for Amoco to retain a 5.5 percent overriding royalty in 
ETW s and 7 .5 percent overriding royalty and 20 percent back-in in 
DTWs. 63 Hugoton drilled successful gas wells and received appropri-
ate assignments, which triggered a "drilling clock" that limited 
Hugoton's right to continue drilling. 64 Hugoton also drilled additional 
56 The farmout provided for an ovcnid.ing royalty of 1/12 of 1/4 of 8/8ths of produclion until 
net profits were rece.ived. the oveniding royalty convened into an cscalming net profits interest. 
The net profits intcre t was specified to be 20 percent of the one quaner interest until recovery 
ohhe first 4 million banels, and 33 percent the.reafter. Sec 812 S.W.2d at 267, n.3. TI1c agreement 
st:1ted that the overriding royalty and es1mlnting net profits interest applied to "the lease." Id. 
at 268, n.4. 
57 812 F.2d at 276. 
58 Id. at 277. The court stated th:1t the provision "goes to a significant purpose behind the 
transaction." 
59 Id. at 276. The coun held thnt the agreement wus "drafted in clear and simple temis, such 
that even a rcadc.r with no expertise in oil and gas transactions could find it comprehensible." 
60 Id. 111 278. The court found 1hat "t.he evidence clearly indicates a deli.berate decision on 
the part of Aminoil , mid-way th.cough the drafting process, 10 reserve an overriding royalty 
interest in production from the subjec1 lcru;c as distinguished from an interest in production from 
PlaLfonn A." 
61 11 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (D.Kan. 1998). 
62 Id. at 1272. 
63 fd. at 1272-1274. 
64 /d. at 1274-1275. The court described the drilling clock as a "use-it-or-lose-it provision." 
Id. at 1274. It appears that Lhe provision was what was termed in SMU, N. 2 mpm at 775, 
a "continuous restricted 01ition" designed 10 avoid or minimize Rev. Rul. 77-176. 
(Matthew Dender & Co .. Inc.) 
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development wells on the assigned acreage which did not meet the 
contract definition of DTW, but the parties believed at the time that 
the wells so qualified and treated them as DTWs. 65 Had the wells 
qualified as DTWs, Amoco would have been entitled to a convertible 
7 .5 percent overriding royalty. If they did not, Amoco retained only 
a nonconvertible 5 .5 percent oven-iding royalty. 66 Amoco contended 
that the subsequent conduct of the parties implied an agreement o 
characterize the two wells as DTWs. 67 The court, however, could not 
find the necessary intent to modify the contract, because the parties 
were unaware that the contract needed to be modified. 68 Subsequent 
conduct would have been helpful to interpret an ambiguous clause in 
the contract, the court said, but neither of the parties asserted that the 
contract was ambiguous. 69 Finally, Amoco argued that the contract 
drilling clock had expired, if the two wells were not DTWs, resulting 
in termination of Hugoton's right to drill additional wells. 10 The court 
found that Amoco's claim amounted to an action for trespass, which 
failed because Amoco had consented to the wells due to the court's 
finding of consent. 71 Amoco in turn urged that its consent was negated 
by mistake, but the court applied the Restatement rule that consent 
is negated only if the trespasser was aware that the consenter was 
mistaken; since both Amoco and Hugoton believed the wells to be 
DTWs, Amoco's consent stood. 
Puckett v. Oelze, 12 also reflects a strict-constructionist approach. 
Puckett farmed out a lease covering a one-quarter mineral interest in 
fifty acres to Oelze with the  a g r e e m e n ~  that Oelze would drill a test 
well on a particular ten-acre tract. The farmout also specified that 
Puckett would assign one-half of his interest in the lease to Oelze if 
the well was not a dry hole and Puckett would receive one-eighth of 
the working interest in the well and the spacing unit on which the 
well was located. Oelze pooled the farmed-out ten acres with ten acres 
from another well and drilled a successful well. Oelze maintained that 
Puckett was entitled only to one-half of one-eighth of the working 
65 11 F. Supp. 2d at l 275. 
66 tbid. 
67 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1278. 
68 tbid. 
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interest, since the spacing unit was twenty acres, only ten of which 
was from Puckett's lease. 73 The court held that the farmout agreement 
was clear on its face, however, and awarded Puckett a one-eighth 
working interest in the well and the twenty-acre spacing unit. The 
Illinois court stated that "where the terms of the contract are plain 
and unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be ascertained solely 
from the words of the contract." 74, 
In Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 75 the court 
rejected a claim of mutual mistake in upholding a summary judgment 
enforcing the right of parties to an operating agreement o an interest 
in a well drilled pursuant to a farmout agreement. 76 The farmout 
agreement specifically provided that it was subject to the operating 
agreement, but the farmee contended that the provision was included 
by mutual mistake and asserted in support of its contention that none 
of its employees had read the final version of the farmout agreement. 77 
The court applied an Oklahoma statute 78 limiting reformation for 
mistake to "mistakes not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the 
part of the person making the mistake," concluding that "the mistake 
alleged ... was caused solely by the failure of [the farmee's] 
representatives to read the farmout agreement."79 
The terms of the farmout agreement may be important in determin-
ing whether equitable compensation may be available. Jn Petrocana 
v. Margo, ao the farmor sought reimbursement for the fair market value 
of geological data that it had furnished the fannee. 81 The court rejected 
the claim, noting that it was "an attempt to state a cause of action 
to recover damages for defendants' non-performance of the [option] 
farmout agreement" inconsistent with the provision that the "only" 
73 Puckett owned a 1/4 working interest in 1/2 of the drilling unit acreage. A "typical" farmout 
arrangement is that the farmor contributes the lease, the farmee drills the well, and the farmor 
and the farmcc share the working interest equally afte1• payout. See SMU. N. 2 supra at 763. 
By this logic, one would have expected that Puckett would have been entitled to 1/16 of the 
working interest in the well. See SMU, N. 2 s11pra al 765-768. 
74 481 N.E.2d at 871. 
75 790 F.2d 828, 89 0. & G.R. 160 (10th Cir. 1986). 
76 790 F.2d at 834. 
77 Id. at 834-835. 
78 Okla. Stat. Tit. 15, § 63 (1981). 
79 790 F.2d at 825. 
80 577 So. 2d 274, 276, 115 0. & G.R. 84 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991). 
Bl 577 So. 2d at 278. 
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penalty for nonperformance would be the forfeit of a cash payment 
and the loss of a right to earn an interest. 82 
Generally, however, the strict construction that most courts give 
farmout agreements arises from the fact that disputes about farmout 
agreements are "just business." They are disputes that arise out of 
complicated and case-specific transactions lhat the parties choose to 
structure. Courts have no particular expertise in reading between the 
lines of farrnout agreements-nor do they have any particular interest. 
§ 3.03. Common Farmout Issues. 
While there is no "model" form farmout contract, farmout agree-
ments raise some common issues that cases surveyed address. In this 
section of the article, developments relating to these substantive issues 
are addressed. 
[1] Key Characteristics of Farmout Agreements. 
There are five key characteristics of farmout agreements: (1) the 
duty imposed: option or obligation, (2) the earning factor: produce 
to earn or drill to earn, (3) the interest earned: divided or undivided, 
( 4) the number of wells: single or multiple well farmouts, and (5) the 
form of the agreement: agreement to transfer or conditional assign-
ment. s3 A single dispute, which has occupied an inordinate amount 
of time of Texas lawyers and Texas courts, illustrates the importance 
that all of these factors may assume. 
In Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc., s4 commonly referred to as 
"Ricane I," the Texas Supreme Court considered a Superior Oil 
Company farmout of part of a lease to Western. One paragraph of 
the present-assignment fannout agreement conditioned Western's 
rights on commencement of drilling operations, while a second 
paragraph required Western to perform all lease obligations: 
"THIS ASSIGNMENT IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOW-
ING CONDITION AND PROVISION: 
82 
Ibid. Professor Martin questions this reasoning at Discussion Notes, 115 0. & G.R. 99. 
See the discussion of the problems of classifying farmout agreements as "obligation" or "option" 
agreements at SMU, N. 2 s11pm nt 811. 
:
3 See SMU, N. 2 supra at 792-796. 
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